While the prevalent understanding of the U.S.-Iranian relationship as beginning with the 1953 CIA-sponsored coup in Iran is reasonable considering the coup’s significant political implications for the two countries, the focus on the developments in the years following the events of 1953 tends to obscure the origins and nature of U.S.-Iranian relation prior to 1953. This understanding of the coup as the starting point and definer of the relationship often inaccurately implies that the features of the post-1953 relations between the U.S. and Iran have been representative of the general trend of relations between the two countries even before 1953. Contrary to this widespread understanding, the relations between the two countries prior to the 1953 coup have had their own characteristics and have also played significant roles in influencing the events that followed. In fact, Iran’s nationalist aspirations prior to 1953 were partly responsible for facilitating the United State’s extensive intervention as Iranian attempts to involve the U.S. in Iran’s politics in the years leading up to 1951 put the U.S. in a more responsive position the act the way it did in 1953.
The origins of the relations between the United States and Iran date back to the mid 19th century, when Iran sought to establish relations with the U.S. in attempts to gain a potential ally in its opposition to imperialist intervention by Britain and Russia in Iran’s affairs. Preceding 1951, many Iranian nationalists considered the U.S. to be a benevolent benefactor and desired for the U.S. to increase its involvement in Iran’s affairs. However, the United States was generally reluctant to assume extensive responsibility in Iran until the years leading up to the coup. In fact, prior to 1951, while U.S.-Iranian relations were influenced by a range of domestic, regional, and global considerations in both countries, what remained consistent was the continued Iranian expectation for heightened U.S. involvement and the United States’ determination to avoid extensive embroilment in Iran’s affairs. The Iranian people saw Americans as democratic liberators and advocators of freedom. This excessively positive image of the United States was bolstered by the actions of the young American missionary, Howard Baskerville.
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| Howard Baskerville's grave in Tabriz, Iran |
The turning point in the U.S.-Iranian relationship came with Iran’s oil nationalization, lead by prime minister Mossadegh in 1951. Britain’s reaction to Iran’s oil nationalization, the heightened Cold War tensions between the U.S. and Russia, and Britain’s diminished ability to engage in operations without the United States’ assistance, led to the beginning of a new phase in the relationship between the U.S. and Iran, initiated by the 1953 coup.
The force that motivated and triggered the coup was the 1951 nationalization of Iran’s oil industry. Having arrived in Iran in the early 1900s, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company promptly struck the largest oil reserves that had yet been found in the world. For nearly half a century, this British-held monopoly extracted hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of oil from Iran. While this extraction of Iranian oil greatly maintained Britain’s prosperity and its military preparedness throughout these years, Iranians received very little of the wealth from the oil pumped out of their own soil – only 16 percent of the profits produced by the company. In the post-World War II years, Iranians became increasingly aware and concerned with this injustice as nationalist opinions began spreading throughout the world. They became informed that, all around the world, other nations with large oil reserves were beginning to force renegotiations with the rich corporations and gaining more control. Leading the fight for complete nationalization, Mossadegh expressed the popular belief that “the source of all the misfortunes in this tortured nation is only the oil company.” His strong support for the nationalization of Iran’s oil resources made him widely popular throughout the country, resulting in his nomination and election as the prime minister in 1951. With the unanimous agreement of parliament, the oil company was nationalized immediately after Mossadegh assumed power, to the disbelief and dismay of Britain. The British, who couldn’t imagine losing this significant source of income, decided to plan an invasion to overthrow Mossadegh and needed American support to see it through.
2Under Eisenhower’s administration, the United States’ understood that Mossadegh’s nationalization of Iran’s oil posed the threat of setting an example for other countries to do the same, threatening the United States’ oil interests by shifting the power from the oil companies of Britain and the United States to the local countries. Because of this fear, when British prime minister, Winston Churchill, appealed to U.S. President Eisenhower with Britain’s plans to invade Iran, Eisenhower’s administration agreed to help carry out the coup.
Throughout Mossadegh's years as Prime Minister, he has made many appearances in the United States' Time Magazine, both in articles and on cover pages. In this June 1951 issue of Dr. Mossadegh is featured on its cover page with the caption: "Iran's Mohammed Mossadeq, Feet first into chaos?" The cover story, titled "Dervish in Pin-Striped Suit," expresses the United States' fear of losing the vital source of oil that Iran's oil industry provided pre-nationalization.
Throughout Mossadegh's years as Prime Minister, he has made many appearances in the United States' Time Magazine, both in articles and on cover pages. In this June 1951 issue of Dr. Mossadegh is featured on its cover page with the caption: "Iran's Mohammed Mossadeq, Feet first into chaos?" The cover story, titled "Dervish in Pin-Striped Suit," expresses the United States' fear of losing the vital source of oil that Iran's oil industry provided pre-nationalization.
